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THE WELFARE CALCULUS
ALLOCATIONS AND UTILIZATION WITHIN THE AMERICAN STATES
John E. Tropman
School of Social Work
University of Michigan
Introduction
Within the history of the American states, the attitude
toward "welfare" had been fundamentally ambivalent. On the
one hand there is a great thrust in this country toward charity,
and toward helping the poor. Much is given each year to United
Funds across the country (860 million in 1972-73), and the
Christmas listing by the New York Times of the 100 "neediest
cases" results in much spontaneous offering of aid. On the other
hand, Americans are singularly suspicious of institutionalizing
this impulse. These suspicions leave the United States behind
other comparable countries in providing social welfare benefits.
Indeed, so suspicious are we about helping the poor that, for a
long time, we really knew very little about them. As late as
1958, Galbraith's volume THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY celebrated the
most pervasive myth about America - that we were wealthy with
cases of need in the minority (Galbraith, 1958). Figures
colleIted by the Census one year later - in 1959 - revealed that
23.4 of the American families had incomes of less than $3,000.
Seemigly, we just did not want to acknowledge the amount of
poverty. Rainwater coumments that "Perhaps so long as economic
exploitation of the poor was central to the working of the economy,
no broad awareness was possible" (Rainwater, 1969:9). For whatever
reason, we were unaware.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the absence of public
awareness was matched by insufficient scholarly attention to
problems of poverty.
Social scientists have been very slow to provide
detailed information on what has become apparent
as the central fact about the American underclass -
that it is created by, and its existence maintained
by, the operation of what in other ways is the most
successful economic system known to man (Rainwater,
1969:9).
This is an average of state figures.
Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological
Association, New York City, August 28, 1973. Assistance in its
preparation was provided in part by a grant from the Horace Rackham
School of Graduate Studies at The University of Michigan.
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Whether or not one agrees with the second part of Rainwater's
assertation, and Piven and Cloward (1971) certainly do, his
initial point is surely correct. And what is true generally about
poverty was true to an even greater extent about welfare. There
is not available a general public analysis which shows where
welfare fits in relationship to poverty in general or to potential
clients in particular, even though techniques for this kind of
analysis are available (Reiner, 1968). Perhaps least is known
about the topic of major interest here - welfare rates and welfare
grants, and their relationship to each other and general social
structural variables, although some work has been done (Dawson
and Robinson, 1965; Gordon, 1969; Collins, 1967; and Kasper, 1968
This general lack of appropriate public and scholarly
attention left the country quite unprepared for the rate and cost
spiral which affected the AFDC program, especially during the 1960's.
The basic response of the country was that there must be many
"chiselers" somewhere, the trends were deplored singly and collec-
tively, the citizenry reemphasized the importance of work, social
workers were damned, and the program itself was faulted. Although
the Nixon Administration used the impetus generated by this up-
heaval to propose a new welfare system, little information was
generated on the whole problem. Indeed, most of the few pieces
available were done during that period (Schorr, 1968).
Welfare Grants and Welfare Utilization
The purpose of this paper is to look specifically at welfare
grants and welfare utilization as a first step in providing greater
comprehension about the welfare system and its relationship to the
poor. There are a number of reasons for this focus. The welfare
rates and grants are the specific elements which, as we noted, fall
continually under public scorn. Whatever feelings and attitudes
exist on the part of the general public become translated into the
level of utilization the state is willing to endure, and the amount
of money the state is willing to provide. And it is these rates
and grants specifically which cause outcry. Additionally, if, as
we suspect, the welfare program does serve some macroscopic func-
tions in the social structure, then along with some variations
within and between states, there should be some uniformities as
well. Hence, we are interested in seeing if welfare utilization
and grant level can be accounted for in a sociological way.
There are several theories currently available which can
account for the level of welfare use in a state and/or the amount
of the welfare grant. The most obvious one is advanced by Collins
(1967) viz., that these variables respond to the amount of need
in the state. Hence, the greater the need, the higher the level
of use and the higher the grant.
A second explanation, and somewhat more general, sees the
welfare program as an attempt to "buy off" the poor in relationship
to the level of demands/violence within the state. This argument
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advanced by Piven and Cloward (1971) is a version of the old
"bread and circuses" approach by which elites keep masses
occupied and tractable. Galbraith goes a step further along
these lines by suggesting that the political importance of the
poor has diminished as the actual number of poor has diminished,
specifically, from being a majority of a population to being a
minority. Hence, as the number of poor decreased, grants should
decrease.
The fourth explanation, and the most general one is also
advanced by Piven and Cloward (1971) and is, in some ways, a
response to the detail demanded by Rainwater (1969). It is
argued that the function of welfare is that of "regulating the
poor" in such a way as to keep a low-wage work force available.
Each of these explanations has a problem. The relationships
between "need" and welfare rates and grants is tenuous at best
(Dawson and Robinson, 1965). While there is no
questions that urban riots and violence had some effect on the
system, as well as the strident demands from "welfare mothers,"
rates and grants went up all over, in every state. Additionally,
one should keep in mind the possibility, which I think is very
real, that urban violence, welfare protest, and increased welfare
utilization and aid were not causally related to each other, but
all the relatively simultaneous consequences of a general loosen-
ing of traditional norms within the decade of the sixties. In
other highly "normatized" areas such as marriage and sex, a similar
relaxing of traditional norms was observed.
Galbraith's hypothesis does not account for the fact that the
political situation of the poor has always been "poor," apparently
regardless of their number. Further, in this interest group
"pluralized" society, a group which comprised 20 of the population
would surely be significant. And finally it turns out that, as
the proportion of poor decline, grants go up, something which
goes contrary to Galbraith's hypothesis.
Could welfare regulate the poor? Quite possibly. Yet most
of the people on welfare are old (Old Age Assistance), blind
(Aid to the Blind), disabled (Aid to the Disabled), or mothers
and children (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). Socio-
logically, an interesting observation about these categories is
that they are, in a sense, free from the "mobility contest"
(Turner, 1961). And it has never been clear in our system to what
extent work norms obtained vis-a-vis women. Furthermore, until
recently, there was a very large gap between the number of "poor"
and those on welfare, a condition which still obtains in poor
states today. Hence, one would have to question the notion that
welfare maintains a low wage work force when people do not even
seek the benefits to which they would be entitled.
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Because of the problems, one is led to look for explanations
of welfare rates and grants in the middle range of theory (Merton,
1958). One such explanation might be that welfare serves, in a
Durkheimian sense, to solidify majority norms of work, and to
reflect a less dominant, but present, norm of charity. In terms
of welfare rates and grants, one would expect them to be sufficient
to satisfy the charitable impulse, yet low enough to be undesirable
(Tropman, 1971). Durkheim comments about collective sentiments
that "The community as a whole must experience them more vividly,
for it can acquire from no other source the greater force necessary
to control these individuals who formerly were the most refractory"
(Durkehim, 1950).
Welfare as Less Eligibility
These two impulses - charity and scorn - generate a pattern
of welfare utilization and appropriation which has been identified
for some time, and specifically as early as 1834 in the English
poor law reform. The principle is "less eligibility." It means
that the condition of the poor shall be "less eligible" than the
condition of the lowest laborer. The original language states:
It may be assured that, in the administration of
relief, the public is warranted in imposing such
conditions on the individual relieved as are
conducive either to the benefit of the individual
himself, or the country at large, at whose expense he
is to be relieved.
The first and most essential of all conditions, a
principle which we find universally admitted, even
by those whose practice is at variance with it, is
that his situation on the whole shall not be made
really or apparently as eligible as the situation
of the independent laborer of the lowest class
(De Schweinitz, p. 123).
Hosbawn comments that:
The residuum of paupers could not admittedly be left
actually to starve, but they ought not to be given
more than the absolute minimum, provided it was
less than the lowest wage offered in the market - and
in the most discouraging conditions. The poor law
was not so much intended to help the unfortunate
as to stigmatize the self-confessed failures of
society (Piven and Cloward, p. 34 n. 67).
One might only add that the avoidance of welfare even by those
who would be entitled, might be, in fact, the avoidance of
engaging in such a self-confession.
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If we look in some detail at the "less eligibility" statement,
we know that part of the requirement, viz., "...his situation on
the whole.. ." is met by the general stigma which attaches to
welfare recipients. What remains is the way in which the actual
levels of "relief" are set, both in terms of the actual monies
received (grants) and the number of people enrolled on the program
(rates of utilization). Since these two variables interact, we
might expect to find that as rates of use go up, the amount per
receipient goes down. Indeed, we would expect that these two
areas would be the ones where the state could exercise the opera-
tional controls required by the less eligibility principle.
Something like this was anticipated in a report on "Workfare"
which appeared in the New Republic.
Because states must contribute a share of the federal
welfare payment, those with the largest welfare budgets
were beginning to worry that welfare would bankrupt
them. California and New York launched drives to get
the "chiselers" off the rolls; they began searching
for a way to reduce welfare costs by changing the
standards of eligibility (New Republic, July 7 and
14, 1973).
And Steiner comments that:
States may not establish waiting lists in Public
Assistance, but they may divide their money into
smaller shares for more people (Steiner, 1971).
... states may either stretch a fixed state
appropriation to cover whatever number of categorical
assistance applicants are found eligible or fix
benefit amounts and meet those amounts by making
supplementary appropriations where necessary (Steiner,
1971:23).
The dilemma, then, is clear. If states are to meet the less
eligibility criteria, then some measures must be taken to insure
that welfare is not too easy to get (monitoring of the rates)
and that the grants are charitable but undesirable (monitoring
the grants).
Could such manipulation occur? It could. It is already
known that grant levels may be changed. Perhaps even more important
is the extent to which the state is willing or able to add to the
basic grant special grants for special circumstances - clothing,
etc. Some states operate on an as needed basis, and some states
simply operate on a flat grant basis for special needs. In any
case, it is clear that the grant level can be adjusted to meet
less eligibility criteria.
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Rate manipulation is another problem. As noted, wait listing
is prohibited, and any needy person presenting himself who is
eligible is to be offered aid. Yet herein lie a host of possi-
bilities. Steiner devotes an entire chapter to the "politics of
eligibility" (Steiner, 1965, Ch. 5). It is also known that the
number of potential enrollees in the program is considerable as
compared to the actual enrolles (Piven and Cloward, 1971).
Further, eligibility determination may take a long or short time,
and people may be removed from the rolls by administrative act,
even though they have a right to a fair hearing concerning the
action. In short, if states operate on the less eligibility
principle, they have the opportunities to adjust the system con-
sistent with such a principle.
There remains an additional point. Less eligibility, as it
has been described, is a relative concept. It implies, first,
an upper parameter, but not a lower one, for welfare activities.
Secondly, and important here, is the fact that states vary greatly
in the number of poor they have to provide for, and the resources
they have with which to make that provision. The differences in
state situations creates different pressures which the state has
to consider. In poor states there is likely to be a pressure
toward extensivity - that is, to help many people, even with only
a little help. In richer states, as the number of poor decrease
and the wealth increases, there is likely to be a pressure toward
intensivity - that is, to improve the condition of the individual
recipient. We would assume that states would respond in this way
- poor states by increasing the level of enrollment in the program,
and rich states by increasing the level of the grant.1 These
hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 1, which contains the 8
variables used in this analysis.
At this point, a sumary is in order. In looking at some
data on rates and grants in welfare, we would expect to see the
following: 1) that grants meet a "less eligible" calculus; 2)
that as rates get too high, grants are adjusted to continue t e
overall less eligible condition; the converse may also occur;
3) that less eligibility operates as a maximum parameter; 4) that
rich states tend to increase grants while poor states are pushed
to increase rates.
llt must be remembered that these increases are really differences
in relative rates, since both rates and grants increased during
the sixties.
21t is possible that if grants become high, they may be lowered
or more people may be enrolled, thus lowering the average.
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Methodology
For purposes of analysis here, eight variables are used,
collected for each state, excluding Washington, D.C. The four
dependent variables are:
Rates and Grants
1. Welfare Utilization, 19661 (cases per 100 families)
2. Welfare Utilization, 19712 (cases per 100 families)
3. Grant - 1968 (Mean monthly payment)
3
4. Grant - 1971 (Mean monthly payment)4
These dependent variables will permit inspection of rates and
grants at two points in time, even though the utilization and grant
figures do not match exactly. The independent variables are as
follows:
Need
5. Poverty - 19595
6. Poverty - 19696
1 The rate was calculated from figures in Welfare in Review,
1967 and the Statistical Abstract, 1968.
2 The figure was calculated from figures in Welfare in Review,
1972 and the Statistical Abstract 1972.
Average Grant for January, 1968, Welfare in Review, November,
December, 1968.
4 Average Grant for June, 1971, Welfare in Review, September
October, 1971.
5 City-County Data Book, 1962. Poverty there is defined as the
% families with means less than $3,000, 1959.
6 Statistical Abstract, 1972. Different levels are given for
families of different sizes. Farm incomes are set at 85% of the
povcut figure. For all families, the total non-farm povcut in
1969 was $3,410. The comparable figure in 1959 was $2,719 for
all families. See Tables 538 and 542. However, as we shall see,
the correlation between them is very high, so the change in
definition does not make a great deal of difference, to mention
nothing of the ten year time difference. Using the recalculated
figures for 1959 ($2,719 rather than $3,000) for all families,
the United States contained 22.1% poor as opposed to 23.47..
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Ability
7. Per Capita Personal Income - 1968 (Statistical
Abstract, 1969)
8. Per Capita Personal Income - 1970 (Statistical
Abstract, 1972)
The mode of analysis is correlational, in which we seek to
examine the relationships between several variables taken two
at a time. It is certainly recognized that more complex forms
of analysis would perhaps be useful, and in another paper we plan
to explore some of these. However, for purposes here, the corre-
lational approach seemed appropriate. Additional data is presented
in terms of average values.
As suggested earlier, we reasoned that the amount of poverty
in a state and the ability of that state in terms of wealth to
provide benefits would be important considerations. For this
reason, the degree of poverty or the degree of state affluence
might be important as an influence on the mentality of state toward
the provision of benefits. Hence, we thought it appropriate to
dichotomize the states by poverty and by ability. This was done.
It turned out that there were only three of the 25 poorest states
which were not also in the 25 high poverty states (Kansas, Nebraska,
Missouri). Examining the correlation coefficients overall, the
"high poverty" states behaved almost identically to the "poor" states.
Hence, it was arbitrarily decided to present the data only by rich
and poor divisions. Basic information data for these variables is
present in Table 1.
TABLE 1
mean Values of Basic Welfare Variables. Utiliaation, Grant.
Need, and Ability, for the Nation and Subdivisions
Basic Variables Means
Nation Rich Poor
Utilization
Welfare Utilization 1966 2.4% 2.38 2.48"%
Welfare Utilization 1971 5.6% 5.95 5.36%
Grant Per Recipient
Grant 1968 $37.00 $44.00 $30.00
Grant 1971 $45.70 $55.00 $35.00
Need
Poverty 1959 23.46% 16.8% 30.0
Poverty 1969 11.60X 8.0 15.A
Ability
Per Capita Personal Income 1968 $3,198.00 $3.640.00 $2.752.00
Per Capita Personal Income 1970 $3.698.00
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$4,137.00 $3,259.00
Two additional calculations are included as points of reference.
First, because less eligibility is often referred to in terms of
the minimum wage, a calculation of the pr capita results of
different levels of the minimum wage, assuming a family of four, is
presented. The per capita figures are presented because there is
often a confusion between individual and family income on this point.
It should be noted that the minimum wage is quite difficult
to ascertain. It is currently $1.60 for non-farm and $1.30 for
farm workers. This yields either two levels or an average of $1.45.
It is significant that raises in the minimum wage have been proposed
and defeated in congress. Most recently the senate passed a bill
permitting a pay floor for non-farm workers of $2.20.
Secondly, the per capita value of the poverty cutoff was
calculated, in order to inspect the relationship between per capita
grant levels and the povcut line. Here again, per capita was
calculated in order to avoid the individual/family confusion.
Findings
Let us begin with the first major contention - that welfare
allocations are provided on a less eligible basis. Several standards
which grants could be "less eligible than" are available. Most
common, and the one referred to'by Hobabawn, is that the grant
should be below the minimum wage. Relevant data are presented
in Table 2. Overall, in the nation, grants are below even the
TABLE 2
get Capita Value of Different Levels of the Minimum Wage.
and the Proportion of States Where Grant Exceeds the minimum 
Wage
Assumed monthly Minimum Wage 
Per Proportion of states Where
Mnmum Total Person, Per month AFDC Grant. Per RecipientWage. pe hour (160 hour ) Family of Four Exceed, the Minimum Wage
1968 
1971
Ntion Rich Poor 
Nation Rich Poor
$1.30 208 $52.00 107.Z 20L 0% 367 68. 12 .
1.45 232 58.00 04 08 0 24 40 08
1.60 256 64.00 02 04 0 1 32 04
1.70 272 68.00 00 0 0 02 04 00
1.80 288 72.00 00 00 0 00 00 00
1.90 304 76.00 00 O0 0 00 00 00
2.00 320 80.00 00 00 0 00 00 00
2.10 336 84.00 00 00 0 00 00 00
2.20 342 88.00 00 
00 0 00 00 0
lowest minimum wage, supporting this interpretation of less
eligibility. However, rich states, by 1971, has an average of
$55.00 per recipient, surpassing the lowest (rural) per capita
minimum, (although rich states tend to be urban) and 18. were
paying more than the $64.00 non-farm per capita minimum. Hence,
the less eligibility hypothesis is sustained, with exceptions.
A second approach would be to look at the per capita value
of the poverty cutoff as the minimum which the poor can be below.
Such a measure stands in danger of suggesting that a poverty
relief program is, technically at least, a poverty creating one.
Relevant data are presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Mean Monthly AFDC Grant Per Recipient.
Mean Value of Poverty Cut off (Povcut) Per Cet
by Year, Nation and Subdivision
Nation end Mean AFDC Grant, Mean Value of Povcut, 0
year Subdiviion Per Recipient Per Capita
1968* Nation $37.00 $ 72.50
Rich 44.00 (72.50)
Poor 30.00 (72.50)
1970 Nation $45.70 $ 75.00
Rich 55.00 (75.00)
Poor 35.00 (75.00)
C Poverty Data as 1969
0 To secure the men, monthly value of Povcut we took the total non farm requirement
for 1969 and 1970, divided by 4, representing average family miss, and then by 12
for the monthly figure.
For both 1969 and 1970, the per recipient grants fall
markedly below the per capita povcuts. Indeed, even using the
rural povcut, at 85Z of the povcut figure, the grants would not
even come close. On this measure, the less eligibility hypothesis
is also sustained.
There is, however, a third approach we might wish to take,
one which looks at less eligibility as a moving point, always in
some low but fairly constant relationship to how "other people"
in the state are doing, financially. One way to such a measure
would be to look at the AFDC grant, per recipient, as a proportion
or the per capita personal income of the state. Relevant data
are presented in Table 4. Perhaps this table most clearly illustrates
the operation of less eligibility. Despite great increases in
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TABLE 4
Mean Monthly AFDC Grant Per Recipient as a
Proportion of Monthly Por Ca its Preonal
Inco"e by Year for Nation, oinMbdiviaion
Year Nation gnd Subdivision
Nation Rich Poor
1968 13.87%
Monthly P.C. Inc. 266.55
1970 14. 84%
13.06%
229.33303.67
15.99. 13.377
Monthly P.C. Inc. 306.22 344.00 271.63
welfare enrollments, and increases in grant levels, the relation-
ship between the average grant per recipient to the per capita
personal income remains very similar for rich and poor states
and the nation, and at two points in time. More detail on this
point is provided in Table 5. The data in Table 5 reveal elements
TABLE 5
Mean Monthly Grant. Per Recipient. AM . 1971. ad Percent
Grant is of Monthly Personal Incom Per Capita, 1968 end 1970
RICH STATES POOR STATS
-4 4 -~ I II - + 1 I 4 -
38.10
45.60
39.80
52.00
32.20
44.40
"4.0
32.60
49.20
44.00
39.00
55.80
45.20
54.00
24.60
36.80
30.90
58.20
71.8U
37.50
40.20
38.60
47.80
47.60
50.30
69.70
57.40
52.20
69.10
35.60
71.60
58.30
42.30
52.90
55.90
43.20
69.30
63.00
72.20
31.10
45.70
32.10
64.60
67.00
44.50
31.10
62.60
54.80
57.20
64.50
-426-
concealed by the averages displayed in Table 4. The range of
ratios runs between a low of .05 to high of .23.
There is now confidence that less eligibility acts as both
an upper parameter in specific cases, and as a general rule overall.
Empirically, it appears that 25% of the per capita personal income
is the limit for AFDC grants. Interestingly enough, in 1970,
this would be $77.00, or only $2.00 more than the per capita
povcut. Hence, the 25 figure links to another measure of less
eligibility - that the grant should not go over the povcut level.
If less eligibility operates as it appears to operate and the
welfare budget has limitations to it, we would expect, as noted
previously, to see negative relationships between rates and grants.
While the processes which may govern both would be admittedly
different, the simultaneous control which the state welfare depart-
ment has over both would suggest at least some attempt to use one
to control the other. Relevant data is presented in Table 6. As
TABLE 6
Correlato R.lationshp etw; Mean Monthly AFDC Grant,
Per Recipient ad Rate of Utilisaion, by Year, Nation, and Subdivimion.
Rate and Grant Ration Rich Poor
Rate 1966/Grant 1968 -. 12 .25 -.3
Rate 1971/Grant 1971 -.05 .22 -.53
Rate 1966/Grant 1971 -.22 .25 -.50
Rat. 1971/Grant 1968 -.02 .09 -.45
can be seen for the nation there is a low level intercorrelation
in the direction hypothesized. The rich/poor breakout suggests
a reason for this low level. All rich-state correlations are
positive between rate and grant. All poor-state correlations are
negative between rate and grant, and reasonably strong. Apparently,
and one would expect this, rich states are able to maintain a less
eligibility posture with modest increases in both rates and grants,
while poor states must sacrifice one or the other.
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Given these results, it is clear that the third general area
of investigation - the extent to which states respond differen-
tially on the basis of need and ability, has already received some
support. Rich and poor states are responding to the grant/
utilization picture in systematically different ways. Specifically,
we suggested that states with greater need would respond by
enrolling more people, and states with less need and more ability
would respond by increasing grants. If this hypothesis obtains,
we should find that the relationship between rates of utilization
at two points in time is stronger in rich states than in poor,
(indicating greater change in rates in poor states). Also, we
should find that the relationship between grants at two points in
time is stronger in poor states than in rich (indicating a greater
change in grants in rich states). Relevant data is presented in
Table 7. Indeed, the high national correlations break out exactly
in the direction expected by the differential response hypothesis.
TAUS 7
Corelatim Ralationships between Rates of Utilization 196 Gad 1971
and Men monthly AFDC Grant. yer Recipient. 1968. and 1971. by
Nation and Rich and Poor Stteo
Rates and Grants Nation Rich Poor
Rat. 1966/Rate 1971 .72 .82 .64
Grant 196/Otmt 1971 .89 .74 .92
The correlations are all, of course, high. Relatively
speaking, however, the lower ones are exactly in the direction
predicted by the differential response hypothesis.
Differential response to "situations in the state" relates
us back to the model developed in Figure 1. Specifically we
hypothesized that as poverty proportions increased states would
respond with an increase in rates, and as ability increased states
would respond with an increase in grants. Relevant data is
presented in Table 8.
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TABLE 8
Correlation Relationships between Race@ of Utiltation
1966 and 1971; Mean Monthly APOC Grate, Per Reciptent,
1968 and 1971, State Need and State Ability
Nat too Rich Poor
Rate and Need
late 1966/Po 1959 .16 -.32 .33
Rate 1966/Por 1969 .34 -.06 .52
Rate 1971/Po 1959 -.01 -.48 .42
Rate 1971/Pov 1969 .16 -.06 .56
Grant and Need
Grant 1968/Pov 1959 -.72 -.34 -. 68
Grant 1968/Poe 1969 -.74 -. 40 -.73
Grant 1971/Poe 1959 -.74 -.36 -. 70
Grant 1971/Poe 1969 -.78 -.37 -.80
late mid Ability
Late 1966/Per Cep.1968 -.10 .36 -.47
late 1966/Per Cap. 1971 .03 .42 -. 14
late 1971/Pet Cap. 1968 .15 .52 -.45
late 1971/Per Cap. 1971 .29 .53 -.06
Grant and Ability
Grent 1968/Par Cap 1968 .68 .35 .60
Grant 1968/Per Cap. 1971 .57 .35 .10
Grant 1971/Per Cap. 1968 .70 .26 .69
Grant 1971/Per Cap. 1971 .61 .32 1.28
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For the nation, the correlations point in the direction of
the hypothesis. As poverty increased, states responded with
increased rates, although at low levels, while grant levels are
strongly, and negatively associated with poverty increments.
However, while increments in ability are positively and strongly
associated with increments in grants, they are also positively,
but mildly, with increments in rate.
Some potentially different interpretations emerge when we
look at the rich/poor state breakout. The poor states present the
clearest picture. As poverty increases there, they respond with
increased rates and decreased (relatively at least) grants. As
ability increases, they respond with decreased rates and increased
grants.
The rich states are more complex. As need increases in rich
states, both rates and grants go down. As ability increases, rates
and grants go up. Further, in rich states, rates seem unrelated
to recent measures of need (poverty 1959). These correlations
behave very differently even though the two measures of need are
highly inter-correlated (+.94). Overall, and in poor states
especially, the differential response hypothesis seems to be
sustained. In rich states another pattern seems to be developing.
Discussion and Implications
Overall the three main hypotheses - less eligibility, rate
and grant manipulation, and differential response, have been
sustained by the data. In the less eligibility case, three separate
types of comparisons were used, and in each case, grants fell
generally below the less eligibility line. Empirically, we can
suggest that less eligibility could be set at less then 25% of the
per capita personal income of a state. This conceptualization
permits the less eligibility figure to rise as states become fiscally
better-off.
Given what appears to be a maximum, however, does not set
the range or the levels within which rates and grants operate.
It was hypothesized that need and ability would be very salient
factors. And indeed, rich states do have the looser relationships
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between grants, and poor states between rates, which would be
required. Yet the poor states seem to present the clearest
picture of adjusting rates and grants to keep within overall
limitations, and the clarity of the poor state pattern emerges
even more strongly in assessing the differential response hypothesis.
Hence, in terms of differential response, the hypothesis is of
limited value in explaining rich-state behavior. Several additional
possibilities present themselves.
Firstly, it may be that rich states are simply more complex
systems than poor states. The increase in complexity would result
in lower correlations on a few specific measures because of the
extensive inter-linking with other factors. One would assume,
under this explanation, that as poor states became richer, they
too would evidence a decreasing clarity of interrelationships.'
However, the rich-state values are not a great deal lower than the
poor-state values. As revealed in Table 8, the median rich-state
correlation, regardless of size, is .355, while the median poor-
state level is .485. The evidence is in the direction of the
complexity hypothesis, but not conclusively.
A second explanation might relate to the fact that rich states
are approaching less eligibility maximum. When this happens, even
though they have less need and greater ability to respond, they
may begin to peak out. Hence, as need increases, within rich states,
rates and grants are trimmed to meet less eligibility parameters
(New York reduced its grant between 1968 and 1971). New York may
have reached a maximum figure, because it alone, in 1968, had a
grant ($71.80) which was over the minimum wage @ $1.60/hr.
($64.00 per person per month, family of four) and within 80c of
the 1968 povcut ($72.50). It shared at 21. the highest grant/per
capita personal income ratio. Like New York, the other high state
"regressed to the mean' by 1971, but was able to do so with a
higher grant.
Certainly at this point questions remain. Three are of
importance here. On an empirical level, one might ask about the
elements within the state which affect less eligibility levels below
the maximum. There is clearly a variation, one which runs from
payments at 8% of per capita personal income to a high of 23.0%
(1970). Clearly we could look into social factors which account
for this variation. Such factors as social class, migration,
unemployment, political culture (Beer, 1969), and the structure
of the state's decisional apparatus might be relevant here, and
indeed, we already have some developing evidence on this point.
Additional empirical work will be helpful in this area.
IThis hypothesis was suggested by William Birdsall.
Secondly, assuming that the less eligibility hypothesis holds
up, one might then ask about the cause of less eligibility itself.
Why should a nation as wealthy as ours take the view, or act in
the way implied in less eligibility? If people are poor, why
should we not help them out of poverty, rather than seeing to it
that they always remain in poverty? An exploration of this question
requires another paper. However, the elements of an answer may be,
as we suggested, Durkheimian in nature, focusing on the reinforce-
ment propensities of success that derive from dislike of the poor.
The less eligible poor automatically confer eligibility and legiti-
macy on the non-poor. Similar to the functions of crime, the
functions of dislike of the poor may serve to increase the
solidarity of the non-poor group, and reinforce the mythologies
which support the existing order.
Finally, there is perhaps a larger question posed by those
data. We are faced with a real and interesting policy conundrum
in the need/ability squeeze. As states have more need they have
less ability. Apart from the tautology, there may be, here, a
general property of systems which is of a serious sort. Host
generally, the more a system needs aid the less able it is to provide
that aid for itself. A recent thesis on urban renewal has sub-
stantiated this same point for cities in developing urban renewal
programs. The more a city needs some renewal, based upon measures
of dilapidation etc., the less able it is to pull together a project
proposal (Hudson, 1973). It is especially clear that poor states,
which have no "reserves" in terms of a wealthy populace which can
be convinced to provide more tax revenue, must continually manipu-
late rates and grants in order to make out. And we are considering
here only one social program. When others, such health, education,
the penal system, etc., are included, the situation may become
truly grievous. The theoretical question, then, is the extent to
which a "need ability squeeze" is a general property of systems.
From a policy viewpoint, the question of how assistance is best
provided under such conditions becomes critical. In the case of
welfare, the Federal government is already providing grant-in-aid
help, but not enough, or in the right manner, to remove poor states
from this situation.
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